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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GENE GARZA, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 20060403-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for murder, a first degree felony; criminal 
mischief, a second degree felony; and three counts of criminal mischief, a third degree 
felony. This Court hasjurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Where defendant's motion to dismiss appointed counsel was premised on 
an intent to secure private counsel, did the trial court commit reversible 
error in denying defendant's motion until private counsel was retained? 
This issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Marble, 2007 UT App 82, f 7, 157 P.3d 371; State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, If 6,155 P.3d 
909. 
II. Did the trial court err in ordering that defendant serve consecutive 
sentences based on the nature of the crimes and defendant's failure to 
show remorse or accept responsibility for them? 
An appellate court"'traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide latitude and discretion 
in sentencing.55' State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, \ 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Woodland, 
945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)). Thus, a trial court's sentencing determination will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes, relevant to this appeal, are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 31, 2005, defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony (Count 
I); two counts of criminal mischief, a second degree felony (Counts II and III); one count of 
criminal mischief, a third degree felony (Count IV); and one count of criminal mischief, a 
class A misdemeanor (Count V) (R. 1-3). At his initial appearance, defendant was found 
indigent, and the court appointed of counsel (R. 18-19). On June 6,2005, John K. West, of 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, entered his appearance (R. 28). On August 19, 
2005, the State filed an amended information, revising Count III to charge aggravated 
assault, a second degree felony, in the alternative (R. 90-92). 
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After a preliminary hearing, the State withdrew aggravated assault as an alternate 
charge in Count II (R. 281-83; R. 380:54). Counts III and V were amended to charge third 
degree felonies (R. 281-83; R. 380:54). Defendant was then bound over on all counts (R. 
118-19; R. 380:51-52, 54). 
On November 18, 2005, defendant, acting pro se, filed a Motion for Counsel to 
Withdraw, asking the trial court to order that his appointed counsel, John West and Joel 
Kattrell, withdraw (R. 130-32). After a brief hearing on the matter on December 12, 2005, 
the trial court denied defendant's motion pending defendant's attainment of private counsel 
(R. 135-36; R. 387:passim). Defendant never retained private counsel. He was represented 
at trial by Mssrs. West and Kattrell. 
A jury convicted defendant on all counts (R. 288-89). The trial court then denied 
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts (Id). Defendant was 
sentenced to consecutive terms of five-years-to-life on the murder conviction, 1 -to-15 years 
on the second degree felony criminal mischief conviction, and 0-5 years each on the third 
degree felony criminal mischief convictions (R. 348-50). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 352-53). The supreme court assigned his appeal to this 
Court for disposition (R. 373). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 25, 2005, at approximately five o'clock p.m., defendant, in the middle of 
rush-hour traffic, leaned out the front passenger window of a car, pointed a gun at the car 
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next to him, and shot its driver, Guillermo Padilla, four times (R. 382:235, 383:369, 439). 
Before Padilla died, his car rammed into defendant's car and then three others (R 3 81:120-
21,123,126; R. 382:240). As defendant and his friends sped away, defendant said, "I think 
I got him, I think I got him" (R. 381:109-10, 133; R. 382:241; R. 383:377). 
On May 25, 2005, defendant spent the early part of the day with his friend David 
Hernandez. (R 383:346,423) A little before 5:00 p.m., Hernandez, Hernandez's girlfriend 
Tiffany Sierra, and their baby Angel accompanied defendant to defendant's mother's 
apartment so that Hernandez could borrow a DVD. (R. 382:231; R. 383:347, 398, 424) 
As defendant was exiting the apartment with the DVD, Guillermo Padilla pulled up 
to the curb in a grey Honda, got out of his car, and started heading toward defendant (R. 
382:232; R. 383:347-48, 424). As they had done before, the two then started arguing (R. 
382:232; R. 383:349, 389, 419, 425). During their argument, Padilla threatened defendant 
several times; however, no one who witnessed the confrontation saw Padilla with a weapon 
(R. 382:234; R. 383:347-49,398,424-25). Defendant, in response, told Padilla, "I can blast 
you right now" (R. 382:235). 
Shortly after the argument began, defendant's mother came out of the apartment and 
told Padilla to leave (R. 383:399, 427-28). Padilla, however, merely drove his car a short 
distance down the road and then started back to the apartment on foot (R.382:233; R. 
383:425). 
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Eventually, someone announced that the police had been called (R. 383:354). Upon 
hearing that news, defendant's mother told defendant to leave (R. 383:353, 403, 428). 
Defendant then climbed back into the front passenger seat of Hernandez's car, and 
Hernandez drove off, with Sierra and Angel still in the back seat (R. 382:236, 383:354). 
Padilla got back into his car and followed them out of the parking lot (R. 382:237; R. 
383:355,429). 
Noticing Padilla's car behind them, Sierra told Hernandez that Padilla was following 
them (R. 382:250; 383:355,429-30). Hernandez responded by turning into a driveway and 
pulling behind a fence in the hopes of hiding from Padilla (R. 382:250; R. 383:355,429-30). 
After a few minutes, Hernandez pulled out of the driveway to see Padilla turn left at the end 
of the street (R. 382:250-51; 383:357-58, 431). Hernandez drove down to the same end of 
the street and turned right (R. 382:250-51; R. 383:357-58,431). 
However, when Hernandez stopped at a traffic light to turn left, he noticed Padilla 
pulling up behind him (R. 383:362, 432). As Padilla came closer, defendant pulled out his 
9 mm handgun and placed it on his lap (R. 382:280-81, 306-07, 323-24; R. 383:438). 
Both cars then turned left onto a major four-lane east-west thoroughfare (R. 3 83:363, 
433). As they did, Padilla pulled up along the passenger side of Hernandez's car and raised 
his right arm in a fist (R. 383:363, 434). In response, defendant leaned out of the front 
passenger side window, pointed his gun at Padilla's head, and fired four shots (R. 381:109, 
132; R. 382:240; R. 383:371, 374, 434). Padilla was hit in the head and the shoulder (R. 
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382:319-23). The two bullets that hit Padilla in the head rendered him immediately 
unconscious (R381:110,148; R. 382:319-21). His car bounced off Hernandez's car and then 
collided with three others (R. 381:120-21, 123, 126; R. 382:240). 
As Hernandez's car then sped off, defendant exclaimed, "I think I got him, I think I 
got him" (R. 381:109-10, 133; R. 382:241; R, 383:377). Hernandez was furious that 
defendant had just shot someone (R. 383:379, 439). Not wanting defendant at his home, 
Hernandez dropped him off at a local bus stop (R. 382:213; R. 383:374). 
Police arrived at the accident scene within minutes (R. 3 81:146; R. 3 82:172-73,181). 
They found Padilla still alive but unresponsive, gurgling in his own blood (R. 381:148; R. 
382:173). Padilla was quickly rushed off to the hospital. He died a short while later (R. 
381:118, R. 382:193). 
After interviewing several people, the police were able to determine that the fatal 
shots were fired from a green Dodge Neon that belonged to a man named David (R. 3 82:193-
94). Within an hour, the police connected the Neon to Hernandez, and went to the registered 
address of the car looking for him (R. 382:194). Defendant quickly became a suspect (R. 
382:196). 
Later that night, defendant threw his gun into the river (R. 3 83:442). He then returned 
to his mother's apartment (R. 383:435). From watching the news that night, he learned that 
the police were looking for him (R. 383:435, 440). 
6 
The next morning defendant turned himself in to the police (R. 3 83:43 5,440). When 
the police asked him about the shooting, defendant told them that he did not know who had 
shot Padilla, that he was not present at the shooting, and that he had not seen Padilla since 
their argument at defendant's mother's apartment shortly before the shooting occurred (R. 
383:440). 
At trial, defendant admitted that he shot and killed Padilla (R. 383:439). Defendant 
claimed, however, that he killed Padilla in self defense (R. 383:433-34). 
No weapons were found on Padilla's person or in his car (R.381:149, 156; R. 382: 
175,192,202-03). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed 
to conduct a Pursifell inquire into his complaints against appointed counsel after defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss that counsel. However, the purpose of a Pursifell inquiry is to 
determine whether a defendant's difficulties with court-appointed counsel rise to the level 
that substitute court-appointed counsel is required. Thus, a Pursifell inquiry is triggered only 
when a defendant seeks dismissal of court-appointed counsel in favor of substitute court-
appointed counsel. 
Here, defendant did not seek dismissal of his court-appointed counsel because he 
wanted substitute court-appointed counsel. Rather, he sought dismissal of his court-
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appointed attorney because he wanted to retain private counsel. Under such circumstances, 
the trial court had no duty to inquire into whether defendant's relationship with his court-
appointed counsel warranted substitute court-appointed counsel. Rather, it only had a duty 
to not interfere with defendant's right to timely secure private counsel. Because the trial 
court's ruling fulfilled that duty, no error occurred in the court's ruling. 
Point II, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive 
sentences. In support, he claims that the trial court failed to consider his criminal history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs. He also claims that the trial court improperly considered 
his age as an aggravating factor, rather than a mitigating one. Both of defendant's 
contentions fail. 
First, the presentence investigation report, which the trial court indicated it had 
reviewed, addressed defendant's criminal history, character, and rehabilitative needs. In 
addition, the trial court implicitly addressed defendant's character and rehabilitative needs 
when, at sentencing, it addressed the depraved nature of defendant's crimes, as well as his 
refusal to accept responsibility for them. Thus, the record does not support defendant' s claim 
that the trial court failed to consider these factors. 
Second, under well-settled law, trial courts must consider a defendant's age as a 
mitigating factor only when the defendant's "extreme youth" at the time of the crimes 
accompanies a lack of a "serious criminal record" and a "lack of sophistication." Defendant, 
who was 20 when he murdered his victim, was not extremely young when he committed his 
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crimes. Moreover, his PSI listed several serious crimes committed both as a juvenile and an 
adult. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that defendant's age was not a mitigating factor, but, rather, a "danger" because 
"[defendant's] judgment is poor as a result." 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPOINTED 
COUNSEL WAS PREMISED ON AN INTENT TO SECURE PRIVATE 
COUNSEL, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION UNTIL PRIVATE 
COUNSEL WAS RETAINED 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it ruled on his 
motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel. Aplt. Br. at 11. According to defendant, because 
his motion listed several grounds to "excuse, dismiss and relieve appointed counsel," the trial 
court was required to inquire into the bases of defendant's complaints before ruling on the 
motion. Id. Thus, defendant argues, the court's "summary denial" of his motion was 
"improper." Id. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. First, the purpose of the inquiry mandated under State 
v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987), is to determine whether a defendant's 
relationship with court-appointed counsel has so deteriorated that the defendant is entitled 
to new court-appointed counsel. Thus, the need for a Pursifell inquiry into a defendant's 
complaints against court-appointed counsel is triggered only when a defendant seeks 
substitute court-appointed counsel. In this case, defendant never requested substitute court-
9 
appointed counsel; rather, he sought only the right to seek privately retained counsel. Thus, 
the need for a Pursifell inquiry was never triggered. 
Second, the trial court did not, as defendant contends, summarily deny his motion to 
dismiss court-appointed counsel. Rather, it merely deferred granting defendant's motion 
until he had retained the private counsel he sought. 
A. Proceedings below. 
On June 6,2005, John K. West, of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, entered 
his appearance as defendant's appointed counsel (R. 28). That same day, Mr. West filed a 
formal request for discovery and a motion to reduce bail (R. 30-33, 34-35). 
On July 1, 2005, Mr. West moved for a continuance of defendant's preliminary 
hearing, which was scheduled for July 6, 2005 (R. 51-52). Mr. West asserted that "[t]he 
discovery in this case is incomplete" and that, because "it is anticipated that discovery will 
be voluminous[, cjounsel will need significant additional time to digest the discovery once 
it has been received" (Id). The trial court granted counsel's motion (R. 55-56). 
A preliminary hearing in defendant's case was held on August 19, 2005 (R. 95-96). 
Defendant was represented at that hearing by Mr. West and Joel Kittrell as co-counsel (R. 
95). At the close of that hearing, the matter was continued to September 20, 2005, both to 
hear more evidence and to allow defense counsel to prepare a motion to dismiss and 
supporting memorandum (R. 96; R. 379:9, 109). Between August 19 and September 20, 
defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum (R. 108-13). Counsel 
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argued the motion at the close of the September 20 hearing (R. 108-13; R. 380:40-43,47-48, 
49-50). In addition, defense counsel cross-examined each State witness called at both the 
August 19th and September 20th hearings (R. 379:44, 78, 91, 97, 101; R. 380:12,17). They 
also presented one witness in defendant's defense (R. 380:27). Nothing during the course 
of the hearings indicated a conflict between defendant and his counsel (R. 379:passim; R. 
380:passim). 
On September 26,2005, defendant was arraigned (R. 120-22). Mr. West represented 
him at the arraignment (Id). Trial was set to begin January 31, 2006 (R. 121). 
On November 18,2005, defendant filed a pro se Motion for Counsel to Withdraw (R. 
130-31). In it, defendant "move[d] the court [to] order court appointed counsel Jon West and 
Joel Kattrell to withdraw" (R. 130). In support of his motion, defendant cited to his 
"constitutional right to obtain and utilize adequate legal counsel, as well as excuse, dismiss 
and thereby relieve legal counsel" (R. 130-31). He cited, as justification for counsel's 
dismissal but without further explanation, "conflict of interest," "incomplete requests," 
"ineffective assistance of counsel," and "lack of communication" (R. 131). Nothing in 
defendant's motion requested appointment of substitute counsel (R. 130-31). 
On December 12,2005, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion (R. 135-
36). During that hearing, neither defendant nor his counsel ever asserted that defendant 
wanted the trial court to appoint substitute counsel (R. 3 87:passim). To the contrary, defense 
counsel's opening comments to the court indicated that defendant was not seeking 
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appointment of substitute counsel, but rather, was seeking to retain private counsel. After 
calling defendant's case, the trial court said something inaudible to Mr. West (R. 387:2). In 
response, Mr. West stated, "Well, he's filed a motion to discharge Counsel; but so far as I 
know, he hasn't retained a private Counsel. He's refused to cooperate with us in preparation 
for the trial." Noting that the case had been set for trial, the court asked defendant, "Are you 
intending to hire Counsel, then?" Defendant responded, "My family's looking into it." The 
court then stated, "Okay, that's fine. Your attorney's on board until you do that. I'm not 
going to permit [you] to go forward without Counsel. So just let me know. We're set for 
trial" (Id). 
When the court then instructed Mr. West to be prepared for trial, Mr. West responded, 
"It's been a little difficult to prepare" because defendant "is not willing to communicate with 
counsel. We've been up to the jail to talk with him about evidence, and he's refused to talk 
with us" (R. 387:3). The court then addressed defendant: 
Mr. Garza, it can only benefit you to talk with your lawyer. That's all 
I can tell you. You're charged with the most serious offense anyone can be 
charged with. I'm intending to go to trial in January. 
I'm intending still to go to trial in about six weeks on this case; and just 
kind of be well served with either immediately getting Counsel on board with 
the understanding that we're going to trial, or begin to participate with your 
own attorney, okay? 
(R. 387:3-4). Mr. West then stated, "Thank you, your Honor" (R. 387:4). 
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A hearing on the State's motion to compel defendant to provide his fingerprints was 
held on January 13, 2006 (R. 183-84). Defense counsel stipulated to the motion (R. 184). 
"Defendant refused to come to Court" for the hearing (R. 184). 
Another hearing on a motion in limine filed by the State was held on January 20,2006 
(R. 187-88). Defense counsel did not oppose the State's motion (Id.). Defendant was 
present at the hearing (Id.). Nothing in the trial court's minute entry indicates that defendant 
sought appointment of substitute counsel at that time; nor does anything suggest an ongoing 
conflict between defendant and his counsel (Id.). On the same day, defense counsel filed its 
proposed jury instructions (R. 258). 
A final pre-trial hearing was held on January 23, 2006 (R. 254-55). Defendant was 
present at the hearing (Id.). Again, however, nothing in the trial court's minute entry 
indicates that defendant sought appointment of substitute counsel at that time; nor does 
anything suggest an ongoing conflict between defendant and his counsel (Id.). To the 
contrary, defense counsel indicated they were ready to proceed with trial (Id.). 
On January 24, 2006, defense counsel filed a motion to sever charges and a motion 
to quash the bindover on the three counts of criminal mischief (R. 260-62, 263-64,265-66). 
On January 31, 2006, just before trial, the court denied defendant's motions (R. 277-78). 
Before trial, defendant never informed the trial court that he had obtained private 
counsel. However, he also never renewed his motion to discharge appointed counsel. 
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At trial, the State presented eyewitness testimony, as well as ballistics and fingerprint 
evidence, establishing that defendant shot and killed Guillermo Padilla and that Padilla's car 
then hit four vehicles (R. 381 .-passim; R. 382:passim). See Statement of Facts. Defense 
counsel did not dispute any of that evidence. Rather, counsel asserted that defendant was 
justified in his conduct because he acted in self-defense (R. 383:passim). As part of that 
effort, counsel called defendant, his mother, his sister, and a friend, all of whom testified that 
Guillermo Padilla had previously threatened to kill defendant, and that Padilla had renewed 
that threat shortly before defendant shot him {Id,). 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges 
(R. 382:331-32). The trial court denied the motion (R. 382:334-35). Following the jury's 
guilty verdicts, defense counsel moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. 
383:474). The trial court also denied that motion (Id). 
Nothing during the course of trial indicated any conflict between defendant and his 
counsel; nor did anything indicate that defendant was dissatisfied with counsel's strategy or 
their performance (R. 381:passim; R. 382:passim; R. 383:passim). 
B. When a defendant seeks removal of appointed counsel because he 
intends to retain private counsel, the trial court has no duty to 
inquire into defendant's dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.. . to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. VI. This right can be met in three ways. First, a 
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defendant may retain private counsel. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,159(1988). 
Second, the court must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. See Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). Finally, a defendant can reject both private and 
appointed counsel and proceed pro se after knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to 
counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-32 (1975). 
In this case, defendant claims that the trial court's treatment of his motion to dismiss 
counsel deprived him of his right to counsel under the second and third options just 
discussed. According to defendant, once he "requested] a substitution of counsel," the trial 
court had a duty to inquire into the reasons for his request. Aplt. Br. at 11. He continues that 
the court failed to do so here and that the purported failure denied him his right to substitute 
counsel and "the opportunity to proceed pro se." Id. 
If defendant had, as he contends, requested substitution of appointed counsel below, 
defendant's claim may have merit. Under well-established law, whenever an indigent 
defendant voices dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and requests appointment of 
substitute counsel, the trial court must, consistent with the defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel, "make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature 
of the defendant's complaints" and "whether the defendant's relationship with his . . . 
appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires [appointment 
of] substitute] [counsel]." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987); see also 
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 1f 27-29, 984 P.2d 382; State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 
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(Utah App. 1998). The purpose of the inquiry, therefore, is solely "to determine if the 
defendant is entitled to other court-appointedcounsel." Foster v. State, 704 So. 2d 169, 172 
(Fla. CtApp. 1997). 
Defendant, however, never asserted either a right to substitute appointed counsel 
below (R. 130-32; R. 387:2). His motion did not request appointment of substitute counsel 
(R. 130-32). Nor did he request appointment of substitute counsel during the hearing on his 
motion or at any time after that hearing (R. 387:passim). Rather, both his attorney's and his 
comments during the hearing indicated that he was only asserting his right to retain private 
counsel (Id). And, where a defendant seeks to dismiss appointed counsel, not in order to 
obtain substitute appointed counsel, but in order to retain private counsel, a trial court has no 
duty to conduct an inquire into whether defendant "is entitled to other court-appointed 
counsel." Foster, 704 So. 2d at 172; see also People v. Courts, 693 P.2d 778,785 n. 11 (Cal. 
1985); State v. Garcia, 75 P.3d 313, 319 (Mont. 2003). 
In each of the cited cases, the defendant moved shortly before trial for a continuance 
in order to replace appointed counsel with privately retained counsel. See Courts, 693 P.2d 
at 779-80; Foster, 704 So. 2d at 170-71; Garcia, 75 P.3d at 317. In each case, the trial court 
denied the motion. See Courts, 693 P.2d at 779-80; Foster, 704 So. 2d at 171-72; Garcia, 
75 P.3d at 316. In each case, the appellate court reversed, holding that the reasons given by 
the trial court—delay, Courts, 693 P.2d at 779; Foster, 704 So. 2d at 171-72; Garcia, 75 P.3d 
at 316, or effective assistance of appointed counsel, Foster, 704 So. 2d at 171; Garcia, 75 
16 
P.3d at 316—were insufficient to overcome the defendant's "right," should he have the 
resources to do so, "to appear and defend with counsel of his own choosing." Courts, 693 
i \ Jd at 780-85; see also Foster, 704 So. 2d at 1" ; 2 ' ; I; Gt wck i;il ; 5 P.3d at 316 22. i line 1 i ,. 
each ca se, the appellat i coi irt rejected an> contention that ati ia 1 ecu irthad adi lty to inquire 
into a defendant's complaints against court-appointed counsel when the defendant sought to 
replace that counsel, not with substitute court appointed counsel, but with privately retained 
CM n ixisel, S ee Cot // is, 693 P 2d i it ' 785 • i 11 : i : » <t< 7 \' 7 > I S< » 2« I, ;l 1' 72 7 3 ; Gt i. • cia 75 I " 3< I t:l 
319. 
As those courts explained, when a defendant secures the means to do so, "the right to 
select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended 
• Wheat v. United States, 4Sh 1 1 S h i h(M 1 988); see also Courts, 693 P.2d 
at 780; Foster, 704 So. 2d at 172; Garcia, 75 P.3d at 3 id. And, that right, although 
"'circumscribed in several important respects,'" United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 
2557, 2561 i -), is not • :irci lmscribe :! by the effectiveness of that defendant's prioi 
counsel, cf. id. at 2561-63 (rejecting claim that, because defendant could not show that his 
actual counsel had rendered ineffective assistance, defendant's denial of right to counsel of 
choice was not prejudicial). 
Consequently, when a defendant seeks to replace appointed counsel with privately 
retained counsel, no Purs if ell-type inquiry is necessary because it is "[irrelevant] whether 
appellant would be entitled to other court-appointed^counsel." Foster, 704 So. 2d at 172; see 
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also Courts, 693 P.2d at 784 n.9; Garcia, 75 P.3d at 319. Rather, the only duty of the trial 
court, under those circumstances, is "to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that a defendant 
financially able to retain an attorney of his own choosing can be represented by that 
attorney." Courts, 693 P.2d at 781 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Foster, 
704 So. 2d at 174 (holding that "trial court... cannot arbitrarily and unreasonably interfere 
with a client's right to be represented by the attorney he has selected") (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Garcia, 75 P.3d at 316 (holding that defendant's "right to decide 
for himself who best can conduct the case must be respected wherever feasible") (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The trial court's ruling in this case fulfilled that duty. Contrary to defendant's 
contention, see Aplt. Br. at 11, the trial court did not summarily deny his motion to dismiss 
appointed counsel (R. 387:2-4). Rather, it only deferred granting defendant's motion until 
defendant actually retained the private counsel he desired (Id). At most, therefore, the trial 
court's ruling shifted the burden back to defendant; that is, when he realized that he would 
not be able to retain private counsel, he should have moved to substitute counsel if, at that 
time, his conflicts with appointed counsel had not been resolved. 
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in sum, the trial court's ruling here was consistent with defendant's right to retain 
private counsel of his choice—the only right that defendant expressly asserted—and should 
be affirmed.1 
I Even if the trial court erred in not conducting an inquiry, 
defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by that error. 
Even if the trial court erred in not conducting a Pursifell inquiry, defendant has not 
shown that he was prejudiced by the error. The failure to condiict a Pursifell inquiry is 
]Nor does this Court's decision in In re TM., 2003 UT App 191, 73 P.3d 959, 
mandate a different result. In that parental termination case, indigent parents received 
appointed counsel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-913 (Supp. 2006) (providing that parties 
in juvenile court proceedings have right to counsel, which includes right to appointed 
counsel if parties cannot afford to hire counsel). On the day of trial, the parents expressed 
dissatisfaction with their attorneys and indicated that they wished to proceed with private 
counsel. In re TM., 2003 UT App 191, \ 7 Without further inquiry, the juvenile court 
rejected the parents' request for time to secure a private attorney, and instead ordered that 
the trial go forward, essentially forcing the parents to either proceed with appointed 
counsel with whom they were dissatisfied or proceed pro se. Id. 
On appeal, apparently neither party asked this Court to review whether the juvenile 
court's ruling was an abridgment of the parents' right to counsel of their choice. Cf. 
Courts, 693 P.2d at 781; Foster, 704 So. 2d at 174; Garcia, 75 P.3d at 316. Thus, this 
Court was not asked to decide whether a Pursifell-type inquiry is necessary when a party 
seeks to retain private counsel rather than substitute appointed counsel. Rather, this Court 
was asked only to address whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering that 
the parents proceed to trial with the same appointed counsel about whom they had just 
complained without first inquiring into the substance of those complaints. Not 
surprisingly, given that formulation of the issue, this Court held that the juvenile court's 
ruling was an abuse of discretion because the court's failure to inquire deprived it "of the 
facts necessary to determine whether substitution of counsel was necessary as a matter of 
sound discretion." Id. at f^ 23. 
In this case, the question of whether a Pursifell inquiry is necessary when a party 
seeks to retain private counsel rather than substitute appointed counsel is squarely before 
this Court. Because In re TM. did not address that issue, In re TM. does not undermine 
the State's argument that such an inquiry is not required. 
prejudicial only if defendant can show that his original allegations against appointed counsel 
"r[o]se to a constitutional level requiring appointment of new counsel" and that, "had an 
inquiry been conducted or had counsel been substituted, the outcome would have been . . . 
better for [the defendant]." State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, fflf 31, 35, 984 P.2d 382; see also 
State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, ^ 14, 27 P.3d 573. Defendant can make neither 
showing here. 
Allegations against appointed counsel To warrant substitution of appointed counsel, 
defendant had to demonstrate "good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete 
breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his [] counsel" which would 
mandate substitution. See State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(citations omitted). Defendant has not demonstrated good cause here. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that, because the record demonstrates that a "breakdown 
in communication" had occurred between himself and his counsel, the record demonstrates 
that good cause existed for substitute counsel. Aplt. Br. at 12.2 However, the only evidence 
defendant cites to in support of his contention are counsel's statements during the hearing 
on defendant's motion to dismiss. 
2Before the trial court, defendant listed four good-cause allegations in his motion 
to dismiss: "conflict of interest," "incomplete requests," "ineffective assistance of counsel," 
and "lack of communication" (R. 131). On appeal, however, defendant asserts only the "lack 
of communication" allegation. See Aplt. Br. at 11-12. Thus, defendant has "abandoned" the 
other three allegations. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, % 14 (declining to consider good cause 
allegations raised below but not briefed on appeal). 
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At that hearing, Mr. West stated that, although defendant had not yet retained private 
counsel, defendant was nonetheless "refusing] to cooperate with us in preparation for the 
trial" (R. 38 7:2). 'vV he tithe court later instructed !"\ Ir v!,v est to be pi eparedfoi trial, I v li v v e st 
respond' -I "'i'1- Iv little difficult In prepare" because defendant "is not willing to 
communicate with counsel. We've been up to the jail to talk with him about evidence, and 
he's refused to talk with us" (R. 387:3). 
. •. 1 1 lisev idence does not establish that si lbstitute counsel w as warranted i index Pur sifelL 
First, "the cause of the breakdown—or who is to 'blame'—in an attorney-client relationship 
significantly affects whether the breakdown constitutionally requires the court to substitute 
a defendant's court-appointed counsel.' Sh lie i \ Scales, 9" 1 6 I '".2d 3' / ' / , 382 (I Jtal i \ pp 
1997) i defendant c:\r-i >t arbitrarily refuse to cooperate with appointed counsel and 
then claim that the complete breakdown in communications warrants appointment of new 
counsel. See id. at 382-83. Rather, defendant must show that his "refusal to cooperate 
1 lad [a] k -gitin late basis ' ' <"' < I at 383 Defendant! la s made no si ich show ii lghere Se ie \ pit 
Br. at 10-13. . • • _ : . 
Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the "breakdown in communication" 
identified at the heat Ing on defendant's motion still existed. by the tli i le of defendant's trial. 
When asked shortly before trial whether they were ready to proceed with defendant's case, 
defense counsel indicated that they were (R. 254-55). Given counsel's statement, the 
reasonable inference is that counsel and defendant had resolved whatever difficulties in 
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communicating that, at defendant's motion hearing, were making trial preparation "difficult" 
(R. 3 87:2). Cf. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, If 32 (holding that defendant's apparent satisfaction with 
counsel after voicing an objection undermined any claim of "a complete breakdown in 
communication"). 
In sum, the record does not support defendant's contention that a "serious breakdown 
in communication . . . had destroyed the attorney-client relationship" to the point that 
substitute counsel was required. Aplt. Br. at 11. Thus, defendant has not shown that he was 
prejudiced by the trial court's failure to inquire into that allegation. 
Better outcome. Defendant also cannot show that "had an inquiry been conducted or 
had counsel been substituted, the outcome would have been . .. better for [the defendant]." 
Lovell, 1999 UT 40,^35. 
First, the evidence of defendant's guilt presented at trial—from his friends' eyewitness 
testimony to the ballistics evidence—was strong. See Statement of Facts at pp. 3-7. 
Second, the record demonstrates that, from the time they were first appointed through 
the end defendant's trial, defense counsel "vigorously and ably represented" defendant 
despite that evidence. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, *f 33. For example, defense counsel filed 
numerous motions seeking dismissal of defendant's charges (R. 108-13; R. 260-66; R. 
382:331-32; R. 383:474); sought continuances when necessary to prepare defendant's case 
(R. 51-52); called numerous witnesses at defendant's trial (R. 383 :passim); and presented as 
strong a self-defense case as the facts allowed (Id). 
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Consequently, even if the trial court erred in not conducting a Pursifell inquiry when 
defendant filed his motion to dismiss appointed counsel, defendant has not demonstrated that 
he was prejudiced by that error. Defendant's claim that the trial court commit ice i. \ . ; -. 
eiror p' ii i» \ >"nJuc(iiJLi tin Jiu|iim. Ibcp'fo^, Oiils. - • • . " • ' • ' '. " ': . . . • 
m i , TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING r H \ T DEFENDANT SERVE CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE CRIMES AND 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO SHOW REMORSE OR ArrFPT 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM 
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion [by] imposing consecutive 
sentences on all counts" because it "did not consider mitigation factors including . , , his 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs, and because the COM.; . . , .q . nca - J 
Lvnsuk:uliofi, ' nln.li lli, • Mil msidered as an aggraval •• * r.rVr man mitigating, 
circumstance. Aplt. Br. at 14, 19. Defendant contends that "[t]he court's failure to address 
and appropriately consider these important statutory factors resulted in improperly imposed 
consecutive sentences." h I at 19 Defendant's claii n lacks i i ic rit ai id si 101 il :I be rejected. 
A t ri; 11 e \ "i i irt' s discretion to impose consecutive sentences is governed by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Under this statute, a court deciding whether to impose 
consecutive sentences must "consider the gravity and circumstances of ;e oiici^i-. 
nmnlvi i if \ M lims, ;nnl (lie history, <.:iaracter5 and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 
Utah Code. Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
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Trial courts have "'wide latitude and discretion'" in deciding whether to order 
consecutive sentences under section 76-3-401(2). State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8, 40 P.3d 
626 (quoting Statev. Woodland, 945P.2d 665,671 (Utah 1997)). "' Sentencing requires such 
discretion because it necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court,'" which, in most 
instances, has presided not only over the sentencing, but "over the trial" as well. State v. 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ffi| 31-32, 25 P.3d 985 (quoting Woodland, 945 P.2d at 671) (additional 
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, this Court "reverse[s] a trial court's 
sentencing decision only if it is an abuse of the judge's discretion." Helms, 2002 UT 12, 
1 8 . 
"A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when, among other things, it 'fails 
to consider all legally relevant factors.'" Id, (quoting State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234,1235 
(Utah 1990)) (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. 
Montoya, 929 P.2d 356,358 (Utah App. 1996). When challenging a trial court's sentencing 
decision on this ground, however, "'[t]he burden is on [the defendant] to show that the trial 
court did not properly consider all the factors.'" State v. Jiminez, 2007 UT App 116, % 13, 
158 P.3d 1128 (quoting State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, If 28, 82 P.3d 1167) 
(additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original). 
Defendant has not met his burden here. 
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v^. Proceedings below. 
After trial, the trial court ordered that a presentence investigation report (PSI) be 
prepared. I he I ''SI addressed defendant's criminal history, his cliai: actei ., at id 1 lis 
rehabilita tion prospects \ ccoi • iingtothePSI defendant* • i-minal record included juvenile 
proceedings for assault, shoplifting, truancy, contempt, and possession of alcohol (PSI at 7). 
Defendant's adult record included an arrest for battery and a conviction for carrying a 
concealed weapon (i < i .), 
Concerning defendant's character, the PSI stated that defendant was egocentric, had 
little or no positive contact with individuals in his community, was affiliated with gangs, and 
had a propensity for extreme violence (PSI at 2, 8). 
Concei ning defendant's rehabilitative needs, the PSI noted that, although defendant 
began using marijuana at age 11 and alcohol at age 13, and although he claimed to have used 
marijuana and alcohol on the day of the shooting, defendant was not willing to participate 
in either a l cohu l i H ill mu aluiM uiiiiiseliiiL1 \ PSI <il 1 "I Mniv importanll ; . il PSI \ti\ia\ ih.it 
defendant fell into the high risk category for recidivism and that defendant was not conducive 
to supervision outside of prison (PSI at 2). 
Based on the foregoing, the PSI recommended tl lat defendant be con n nitted to prison 
»11 owed and that all of his sentences run consecutively (PSI at 1). 
At sentencing, defendant declined to make any statement (R. 384:8). However, 
defense counsel affirmed that he had reviewed the PSI with defendant (R. 384:3). Defense 
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counsel indicated, first, that he wanted to clarify that the factual summary "was based on the 
police reports and not on any summary of trial" (R. 384:4). He indicated, second, that the 
preparer had failed to note any mitigating circumstances on the "page having to do with the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances" (R. 384:5). According to counsel, the preparer 
should have marked as mitigating factors "that the offender acted under strong provocation," 
"that there were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to 
establish a defense," that "the offender is young," that "restitution would be severely 
compromised by incarceration," that "the offender's attitude suggests amenability to 
supervision," and that "all offenses were from a single criminal episode" (R. 384:5-6). 
Counsel concluded, "I'm not going to belabor this because the court sat through the trial and 
the court's heard all the evidence, and I believe that there are sufficient mitigating 
circumstances to justify a concurrent sentence" (R. 384:6). 
The prosecutor argued in support of the PSF s recommendation that defendant receive 
consecutive sentences (R. 384:6). The prosecutor first identified numerous aggravating 
circumstances not noted on the PSI's mitigation/aggravation checklist, including that "the 
injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive" because defendant shot his victim 
during rush hour traffic, causing the victim's car to hit three other vehicles; that "there were 
multiple . . . victims"; and that "the offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a 
less restrictive setting" given "his continued denial of responsibility" and his denial of "any 
gang affiliation despite the strong evidence to the contrary" (R. 384:7). 
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I he proseci ltor then disputed the mitigating factors raised by defens s coi nisei rI lie 
prosecutor noted, in particular, that defendant "presented his self-defense argument to the 
jury and the jury rejected it" (R. 384:8). 
:.' v foi L .;:;.:".: icing sentence, the tr ial coi lr t made tl le fc 11 owing obse i v ations:: 
A couple of comments, particularly with regard to your 
testimony at trial, Mr. Garza. I found it particularly chilling. You 
showed no remorse for taking a human life and for threatening the lives 
[of] three other people 
As [the prosecutor] has stated, of particular concern to me at the 
trial was that not only did you show no insight into your taking of 
another human being's life, but you repeatedly justified it and acted 
with a degree of pride in your behavior. And that, as much as anything 
else, tells me that you simply don't belong in society. 
I truly can find no mitigating circumstances in this. The 
provisions that [you] cited, I can find utterly no excuse for your 
behavior . .. . You know, someone makes a gesture, you don't go out 
and kill them, you don't shoot them at close range in the head twice, 
and then other parts of the body twice. 
The fact that you're young, I think is not a mitigating factor, n 
anything, I see it as an aggravating factor. I think your youth is a 
danger. Your judgment is poor as a result, perhaps, of your youth. I 
mean, this is a crime of such violence and such danger to other people 
it is really beyond comprehension to me. 
I tend to agree with [the prosecutor] also with regard to the 
additional aggravating factors of the property loss being unusually 
extensive. You endangered many people, harmed both the persons and 
property of people other than your intended victim. And they too were 
victims of this offense. 
(R. - ^ * ie court then announced defendant's sentences and ordered that they run 
i .•• * !* >fdefend.*"'1"- * i" -v- ;-"-jn , ,;nf , i> *: ' 
serve a minimum of six years in prison (R. 348-50). 
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B. The trial court considered defendant's history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs. 
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider his criminal history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs in ordering consecutive sentences. See Aplt. Br. at 18-20. 
Defendant's argument appears to be that, because the trial court failed to expressly 
"discuss[]" these factors, it also failed to consider them. See id at 18 (asserting that his "lack 
of a serious criminal history" and "his character and rehabilitative needs justified some 
weight and discussion"). 
Nothing in Utah case law, however, requires a trial court to expressly address each of 
the statutory factors listed in section 76-3-401(2) before ordering consecutive sentences. See, 
e.g., State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ffif 10, 13, 40 P.3d 626 (rejecting contention that appellate 
court should assume trial court did not consider statutory factors "simply because it did not 
address each of the factors on the record"); State v. Jiminez, 2007 UT App 116, \ 15, 158 
P.3d 1128 (same). 
Rather, so long as the record indicates that such information was presented to the 
court and that the court reviewed such information before sentencing, the record "evidence[s] 
. . . that the trial court did consider all of the factors." Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 13; see also 
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 68, 52 P.3d 1210 (affirming consecutive sentences even though 
"the trial court did not specifically address the enumerated factors in [the statute]" where trial 
court's statements at sentencing indicated court had considered them); Jiminez, 2007 UT App 
116, Tj 15 (holding that, where PSI addressed all factors and trial court stated it had reviewed 
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PSI, even if trial court 's statements at sentencing "pertained exclusively to the gravity and 
circumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the 
statutorily prescribed factors"); State v. Thorkelson, 2004 • , « . • 
(affirm i- u eon^<^n :- •-. : >nces evei 1 thoi igh c :>"! ii: I: did not specifically a idress statutory 
factors where court "relied on [defendant 's] PSIs ," which did). Such is the case here. 
As previously stated, defendant 's PSI addressed defendant 's criminal history, 
L .. ii . u . . . : : . « . v. I i . ; : • • . . . • :,. . 'v _ i t . . < ; ; ^ v i LIL ' . IKK;: LL N s e l l . l l v j i n u i i L \ : i n I U , 
the trial court indicated that it had reviewed defendant 's PSI (R. 384:3). Because the PSI 
addressed the statutory factors of defendant 's history, character, and rehabilitative needs, the 
trial court 's statement that it had reviewed the PSI "evidences that the trial court did consider 
[defendai it 's] histoi > character , ai id re habilitative needs " I L ?lms, 2002 [ ] 1 12 ] [ 13; s< ' : " 
also Bluff, 2002 U T 66, If 68; Thorkelson, 2004 U T App 9, \ i i . 
That the trial court did not consider defendant 's "history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs" as "mitigation factors," see Aplt Br at 19, does not mean, as d e f e n d suggests, u. . * 
the trial court did not consider those factors. First, nothing in defendant 's PSI—which 
reveals defendant 's violent nature and his substantial criminal history despite his young 
age—suggests that any of these factors were in fact mitigating. Second, the trial court 's 
statements at sentencing—recalling defendant 's "chilling" trial testimony. in \\hieIi 
showed "no remorse," but rather, "a degree of pride in [his] behavior"—confirm that the 
court uiu consider defendant 's character and rehabilitative chances at sentencing (R. 384:7-
29 
9). It just did not consider them to be mitigating factors. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 14 
(stating that the mere "fact that [defendant] views [his] situation differently than did the trial 
court does not prove that the trial court neglected to consider" the relevant factors); see also 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 68 (holding that trial court's focus on "heinous nature of the crimes, 
Bluffs indifference to [the victim's] injuries, and Bluffs position and contentions at trial" 
indicated that it had considered Bluffs character, as well as other relevant factors, in 
ordering consecutive sentences); Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, j^ 14 (noting that "a court 
necessarily makes a personal determination whenever it imposes sentence"). 
In sum, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that the trial court failed 
to consider the statutory factors of his criminal history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
before ordering that he serve consecutive sentences. Thus, defendant's challenge to the trial 
court's order on those grounds fails. 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant's 
age as a mitigation factor. 
Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in [rejecting] an argument of counsel, that 
[defendant's youth should operate to mitigate his punishment and justify concurrent 
sentences on all five counts." Aplt. Br. at 16. According to defendant, Utah courts have 
regularly "recognized youth to be mitigation evidence," especially when combined with a 
lack of criminal history, lack of sophistication, and some promise of rehabilitation, and the 
trial court should have done so here. Id. at 17. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
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The origin of defendant's claim is State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). See 
Aplt. Br. at 16-17. Strunk was 16 years old when he forced a 6-year-old neighbor into his 
mother's car, drove her into the mountains, sexually abused her, and ultimately strangled her 
to death. Tried as an adult, Strunk was convicted of capital murder, child kidnapping, a first 
degree felony, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony. Id. at 1298. He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. Id. He received the highest minimum 
mandatory terms of 15-years-to-life and 9-years-to-life for the first degree felonies. Id. All 
sentences were ordered to run consecutively, with the result that Struck would not be eligible 
for parole on his first degree felonies for 24 years. Id. 
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded the sentences on Strunk's first 
degree felonies. It reversed Strunk's minimum mandatory sentences because the trial court 
"did not consider Strunk's age as a mitigating factor." Id. at 1300. It reversed Strunk's 
consecutive sentences because the trial court "fail[ed] to sufficiently consider defendant's 
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes." 
Id. at 1302 (voicing concern that consecutive sentences that essentially imposed 24-year 
minimum mandatory term denied the Board of Pardons flexibility to choose how much time 
Strunk would serve in the event Strunk was able to rehabilitate himself). The court 
concluded that, "if on remand the trial court again imposes the longest minimum mandatory 
terms for these two offenses, all three terms should be ordered to run concurrently to afford 
the Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust Strunk's prison stay to match his progress in 
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rehabilitation." Id. Cf. State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ffi[ 22, 25, 82 P.3d 1167 
(affirming consecutive sentences where record established that trial court considered 17-year-
old defendant's "extreme youth" and "limited criminal history" and sentences resulted only 
in 15-year minimum term). 
Since Strunk, numerous cases have addressed its application at sentencing. See, e.g., 
State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ffif 24-25, 132 P.3d 703 (addressing in context of 
minimum mandatory sentences); State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ]f 14, 113 P.3d 992 
(minimum mandatory); State v. Lehman, 2004 UT App 404U at *2 (consecutive sentences); 
State v. Trujillo, 2003 UT App 48U at * 1 (same); State v. Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, % 23, 
12 P.3 d 103 (minimum mandatory and consecutive sentences); State v. Laxton, 1999 UT App 
365U at *1 (consecutive sentences); State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1996) 
(same); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah App. 1993) (same). 
Uniformly, those cases have held that a defendant's age "should be considered as a 
mitigating factor only 'when a defendant is very young and unsophisticated.'" Malaga, 2006 
UT App 103, \ 27 (affirming maximum minimum mandatory sentence where "[defendant 
was twenty years old when he committed the crimes at issue here, and he had an extensive 
juvenile record as well as a conviction as an adult") (quoting Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, 
H 14); see also Lehman, 2004 UT App 404U at *2 (finding Strurik inapposite where 
defendant"was twenty-two years old, not of extreme youth, when he committed the crimes" 
and defendant "ha[d] a criminal history" involving similar offenses); Trujillo, 2003 UT App 
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48U at *1 n.3 (affirming consecutive sentences for 22-year-old defendant where '"Strunk 
stands only for the proposition that young age . . . may be a mitigating factor'") (quoting 
Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 457) (emphasis in original); Pier son, 2000 UT App 274, \ 23 (finding 
Strunk inapposite where defendant "was not sixteen years old5 nor did his criminal record 
lack prior violent crimes"); Laxton, 1999 UT App 365U at * 1 (rejecting defendant's reliance 
on Strunkto challenge consecutive sentences where "'[ejxtreme youth and the absence of 
prior violent crimes are not at issue'") (quoting Montoya, 929 P.2d at 359); Montoya, 929 
P.2d at 359 (rejecting 23-year-old defendant's reliance on Strunkto challenge consecutive 
sentences where "extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes are not at issue"); 
Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 457 (holding that "Strunk stands only for the proposition that young age 
. . . may be a mitigating factor"; finding Strunk inapposite where "the two elements deemed 
critical by the supreme court [in that case]—extreme youth and absence of prior criminal 
behavior—are lacking") (emphasis added). 
Strunk does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to view 
defendant's age as a mitigating factor here. Specifically, defendant was neither extremely 
young nor lacking a criminal record when he committed the present crimes. Rather, he was 
20 years old and had both a juvenile and adult record that included violent crimes (PSI at 2, 
R. 7-8). Given those facts, the trial court was not bound to view defendant's age as a 
mitigating factor. See Lehman, 2004 UT App 404U at *2; Trujillo, 2003 UT App 48U at * 1 
n.3; Montoya, 929 P.2d at 359. 
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Nor has defendant shown that, as a matter of law, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it considered his age as an aggravating factor where defendant's prior record, as well 
as his present crimes, supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant's "youth is a 
danger" in that his "judgment is poor as a result, perhaps, of [his] youth" (R. 384:7-9). 
Nothing in Utah case law precludes a trial court from doing so. See, e.g., Strunk, 846 P.2d 
at 1300-02; Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ffij 24-25; Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, \ 14; Pierson, 
2000 UT App 274, f 23; Montoya, 929 P.2d at 359 ; Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 457. 
In any case, even if the trial court erred when it viewed defendant's youth "[i]f 
anything,... as an aggravating factor," defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the 
court's error. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances in this case (R. 384:7-9). 
In contrast, the trial court found numerous aggravating circumstances—in addition to 
defendant's age—including the violent nature of defendant's crimes, defendant's lack of 
remorse, his repeated attempts to justify his criminal conduct, his even taking "a degree of 
pride in [his] behavior," the extent of "property loss" attributed to defendant's conduct, and 
the fact that there were "many" victims in this case "other than [defendant's] intended 
victim" (Id). 
Where, as here, so many aggravating circumstances supported the trial court's 
consecutive sentence decision, defendant cannot show that his sentence would have been 
different had the trial court not also considered defendant's youth as, "[i]f anything,... an 
aggravating factor" (R. 384:7-9). See Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301 (holding that trial court's 
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reliance on improper aggravating factor is harmless where additional aggravating factors 
supported sentence). 
Thus, defendant's claim that the trial court erred in not more favorably considering 
his age at sentencing also fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 72=i June 2007. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney GeneraL 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK \ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3 . Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab 
Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is 
younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 
Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(7) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Sectioji 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits 
an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to hu-
man life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed 
in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate 
offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the 
predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the 
commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under 
Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the 
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is estab-
lished under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder 
that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death 
of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 
76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection 
(4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then 
existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
§ 76 -6 -106 . Criminal mischief 
(1) As used in this section, "critical infrastructure" includes: 
(a) information and communication systems; 
(b) financial and banking systems; 
(c) transportation systems; 
(d) any public utility service, including the power, energy, and water 
supply systems; 
(e) sewage and water treatment systems; 
(f) health care facilities as listed in Section 26-21-2, and emergency fire, 
medical, and law enforcement response systems; 
(g) public health facilities and systems; 
(h) food distribution systems; and 
(i) other government operations and services. 
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys 
property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and 
as a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impair-
ment of any critical infrastructure; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or 
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or 
caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(3)(a)(i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony. 
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor. 
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony, 
(b) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value; 
(ii) third degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 
in value; 
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in 
value; and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss less than $300 in value. 
(4) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer 
crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of any item, computer, computer 
network, computer property, computer services, software, or data includes the 
measurable value of the loss of use of the items and the measurable cost to 
replace or restore the items. 
(5) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order 
any person convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, 
state, or local unit of government, or any private business, organization, 
individual, or entity for all expenses incurred in responding to a violation of 
Subsection (2)(b)(ii), unless the court states on the record the reasons why the 
reimbursement would be inappropriate. 
§ 76-3—401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)03). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) Tliis section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned'' means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section '64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
